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NOTES
THE "PASS-ON" DEFENSE AND REGULATED
PUBLIC UTILITIES
In the recent "Philadelphia price-fixing cases," twenty-nine companies
and a number of officers were convicted of price fixing in various lines of
heavy electrical equipment.1 In the wake of these convictions has come a
flood of suits instituted by private electric utility companies,2 which seek
to recover treble damages 3 under section 4 of the Clayton Act, claiming
injury to the extent that the price they paid for equipment exceeded a
competitive price.4
One of the greatest obstacles to recovery in these suits is the "pass-on"
defense.5 The cases sustaining this defense to a treble damage action for
an overcharge hold that a plaintiff must not only prove that he paid an
excessive price by reason of a conspiracy or monopoly, but also that he
"absorbed" the overcharge and did not escape its impact by passing it on in
the form of a higher resale price to a subsequent purchaser. 6
The relevance of this defense to a regulated electric utility company
is apparent. 7  Both as a constitutional right 8 and as a result of sound
regulation by the state regulatory agencies, 9 public utilities are permitted to
recover all their necessary and reasonable costs plus a fair return on their
investment. One of the costs of service which a utility recovers is deprecia-
I See 2 TRADE REG. REP. 8801 (1961).
2 See, e.g., 68 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 997 (1961), which reports that forty-four regu-
lated utility companies have filed suit in New York. These companies comprise
one-sixth of all investor-owned utilities in the United States. Suits have also been
filed by municipalities who liurchased equipment. See, e.g., Complaint, City of Pitts-
burgh v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Civil No. 30935, E.D. Pa., Feb. 5, 1962.
3 Clayton Act §4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). This section
supersedes Sherman Act § 7, 26 Stat 210 (1890), which was repealed by the Act
of July 7, 1955, 69 Stat. 283.
4 See, e.g., Complaint, p. 4, Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
Civil No. 30016, E.D. Pa., Aug. 2, 1961; Complaint, pp. 12-13, Conowingo Power
Co. v. General Elec. Co., Civil No. 30027, E.D. Pa., Aug. 2, 1961.
5 See generally HALE & HALE, MARKET POWER: SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER THE
SHERMAN ACT 385-88 (1958) ; Note, The Defense of "Passing On" In Treble Damage
Suits Under the Antitrust Laws, 70 YALE L.J. 469 (1961) ; Note, Antitrust En !orce-
ment By Private Parties: Analysis of Developments In. the Treble Damage Suit,
61 YALE L.J. 1010 (1952).
6 See cases cited notes 24-25 infra.
7 See Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages in
Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 231, 251
(1961).
8 FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 605 (1944); Smyth v. Ames,
169 U.S. 466 (1898). See NICHOLS, RULING PRINCIPLES OF UTILITY REGULATION-
RATE OF RETURN 10-30 (1955).
9 See NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 32 n.3.
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tion on capital assets. An appropriate amount is deducted annually from
general revenues and charged to a depreciation account. If these annual
charges are adequate, the utility will completely recoup amounts expended
for capital equipment by the time the assets are retired.'0 Since the funds
for this charge are derived from the utility's ratepayers, a utility does, in a
sense, pass on its capital equipment costs, but it remains to be determined
whether this fact should preclude a utility's recovery of an overcharge on
equipment."
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PASS-ON DEFENSE
A. "Damage" Under the Interstate Commerce Act
The pass-on defense was introduced into American jurisprudence in
connection with the Interstate Commerce Act. Section 1 of that act pro-
hibits carriers from charging "unjust and unreasonable" rates 2 and sec-
tion 8 makes carriers liable for the "full amount of damages" caused by a
violation. 13
In Burgess v. Transcontinental Freight Bureau,14 the Interstate Com-
merce Commission determined that certain rail rates on lumber were ex-
cessive and awarded as damages the difference between the actual shipping
cost and a cost determined on the basis of a reasonable rate. The railroads
1OSee BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTII.rY RATEs 192-223 (1961);
CLEMENS, EcoNoMIcs AND PUBLIC UTILInTaS 189-216 (1950); TRAcxsEL, PUBLIC
UTILITY REGULATION 297-310 (1947).
1 1This Note is concerned solely with the validity of the pass-on defense in the
context of an "overcharge" situation and not in a situation in which the plaintiff has
merely been discriminated against by the pricing policy of the defendant. Although
it can be argued that if a plaintiff is discriminated against he has been overcharged
by the amount of preference given to his competitor, this is not a true "overcharge"
situation. The distinction lies in whether the plaintiff claims damage by reason of
his being forced to pay more than a fair competitive price for an article or whether
he claims damage merely by reason of discriminatory pricing on the part of defend-
ant. Compare Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390
(1906), with Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1957).
"Overcharge and discrimination have very different consequences, and must be kept
distinct in thought." ICC v. United States, 289 U.S. 385, 390 (1933). Because
this Note is not concerned with injuries inflicted by discriminatory pricing, those
cases arising under the Robinson-Patman Act which consider the pass-on defense
will not be examined. See, e.g., Freedman v. Philadelphia Terminals Auction Co.,
TRADE REG. REP. (1961 Trade Cas.) 70,010 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 1961); Youngson v.
Tidewater Oil Co., 166 F. Supp. 146 (D. Ore. 1958) ; Note, Private Recovery under
the Robinson-Patmam Act, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 698 (1962). In an overcharge case,
the most significant question is who in a chain of purchasers shall be permitted to
recover, not how much. The defendant is liable for the amount by which the price
he charged exceeded a fair, competitive price. It is the application of the pass-on
defense in deciding this question to which this Note is addressed. In the Robinson-
Patman cases, the primary question is how much should the defendants be held
liable because of a discriminatory price given to one of his customers. In answering
this question the possibility of pass-on means that the plaintiff may not have been
affected by the lower price given to his competitor-in effect a rebate-if plaintiff
was able to continue selling to his own customers at the same price.
1224 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(5) (1958).
1324 Stat. 382 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §8 (1958).
1413 I.C.C. 668 (1908); accord, Kindelon v. Southern Pac. Co., 17 I.C.C. 251
(1909); Nicola, Stone & Myers Co. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 14 I.C.C. 199 (1908).
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objected that the shippers had not been damaged by this amount, contending
that the customers of the shippers were the real damaged parties since the
advance in the freight rate had been added to the price paid by the con-
sumer.15 The Commission rejected this interpretation of "damage" in sec-
tion 8, holding that payment of the excessive rate established the damage
and that no inquiry would be made into whether or not the shippers had
passed on the excess. Two reasons were presented in support of this posi-
tion: first, if the economic impact of every excessive charge had to be
traced to its ultimate incidence, "it would never be possible to show dam-
ages with sufficient accuracy to justify giving them ;" 16 second, since the
railroads had no right to retain the amount they had collected in excess
of the reasonable amount, they should have no grounds for complaint
about refunding the overcharge simply because the shippers "may have
obtained some portion of this sun from the consumer." -t7
The Commission's construction of the word "damage" and its rejec-
tion of the pass-on defense was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Southern
Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co.'8 "The plaintiffs suffered losses
to the amount of the verdict when they paid. Their claim accrued at once
in the theory of the law and it does not inquire into later events." 19
Mr. Justice Holmes, for the court, added another argument for ignoring
pass-on: since privity of contract is essential to recovery of an overcharge
under the Interstate Commerce Act, "damage" should be interpreted to
facilitate recovery by the shipper, the only party in privity with the railroad.
Otherwise the railroads would be able to retain their illegal profits.
20
B. The "Oil Jobber" Cases
The next attempt to use the pass-on defense proved successful. Fol-
lowing the conviction of several oil companies for raising and fixing the
tank-car spot market price of gasoline,2 ' a number of jobbers who bought
gasoline from these defendants for resale brought treble damage actions
under section 4 of the Clayton Act. The complaints alleged damages on
two theories: first, that the price-fixing activities of the defendants had
reduced the jobber's margin of profit on gasoline handled; 22 and second,
15 13 I.C.C. at 680.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 245 U.S. 531 (1918) ; accord, Adams v. Mills, 286 U.S. 397 (1932) ; Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 269 U.S. 217 (1925). The sole question
on appeal in Darnell-Taenzer was "whether the fact that the plaintiffs were able
to pass on the damage that they sustained in the first instance by paying the unreason-
able charge, and to collect that amount from the purchasers, prevents their recovering
the overpayment from the carriers." 245 U.S. at 533.
19 Id. at 534.
20 Ibid.
21 See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 23 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Wis. 1938),
aff'd sub nonm. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
22 See, e.g., Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 42 F. Supp. 369
(W. D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 130 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1942).
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that the price fixing had increased the cost of gasoline to the jobbers and
injured them to the extent that this increased cost exceeded the cost which
would have prevailed in a competitive market.23 The courts uniformly
denied recovery on both theories. As to the second, they held that to
prove injury under section 4 a plaintiff must not only establish payment
of an excessive price by reason of an antitrust violation, but he must also
allege: and prove25 that he absorbed the overcharge and did not pass it
on in the form of a higher resale price to a subsequent buyer. Due to the
general market structure 26 and in some cases contracts which guaranteed
the jobber a set margin of profit on all gasoline handled,2 7 none of the
plaintiff-jobbers were able to sustain this burden. 28
C. The Hanover Shoe Case
Although no other court since the "oil jobber" cases has squarely
rested a denial of an overcharge recovery on these grounds,2 9 several have
cited the result approvingly in dictum.3 0 The only exception to this general
2 3 See, e.g., Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945). In the Leonard case, supra note 22, the complaint
also alleged damages by reason of reduced volume of both profits and business due to
the increased cost. See also Miller Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441, 448
(4th Cir. 1958). Damage due to decreased volume has been mentioned by several
commentators as a possible theory of recovery in overcharge cases but no case has
been found sustaining such a theory. See HALE & HALE, op. ci. supra note 5, at
387-88; Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Danmages in Private
Antitrust Suits, 52 MIcH. L. REV. 363, 406 (1954); Comment, 18 U. Cnr. L. REv.
130, 136 (1950).
24 Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 734 (1945); McCain v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 64 F. Supp. 12 (W.D.
Mo. 1945); Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 42 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Wis.),
appeal dismissed, 130 F.2d 535 (1942); H. E. Miller Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 37 F. Supp. 831 (E.D. Mo. 1941).
25 Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119
F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941).
2 G1n all these cases the jobbers' profit margins were kept constant due to the
power of the conspiracy to. set both the tank-car spot market price at which the jobbers
bought, and the retail price that determined the jobbers' selling price. See North-
western Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra note 25.
27 See Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941).
28 The "oil jobber" cases are criticized in Comment, 18 U. CHL L. REv. 130,
136-37 (1950).
2 9 Again, excepting those cases employing the pass-on defense in the Robinson-
Patman area. See note 11 supra.
30 Miller Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441, 448 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Wolfe
v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427, 432-33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915
(1955); Banana Distributors, Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32, 47 (S.D.
N.Y. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 269 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Beacon Fruit &
Produce Co. v. H. Harris & Co., 160 F. Supp. 95, 102 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam,
260 F.2d 958 (1st Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959). There is some
dispute as to whether in the Wolfe case, mpra, the pass-on defense was the basis for
denial of recovery or whether it was merely mentioned in dictum. Compare Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826, 831 n.12 (M.D. Pa.),
aff'd per curiam, 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960), with
70 YALE L.J. 469, 473 n.33 (1961). Inasmuch as the plaintiff's case in Wolfe had
numerous weaknesses, it is doubtful that the court's discussion of the plaintiff's failure
to show that its increased costs had not been passed on was necessary to the decision.
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acquiescence appeared recently when, following the conviction of the United
Shoe Machinery Company for monopolizing the shoe machinery industry,3 1
Hanover Shoe, Inc. brought a treble damage action alleging that it had
been damaged by the excessive rentals charged by United for the use of its
machinery. United raised the pass-on defense on motion to dismiss, urging
that Hanover had escaped injury by passing on the excessive rentals to its
customers in the price it charged for its shoes. The trial court held that
if United had charged an excessive rental in violation of the law, Hanover
had been injured the moment it paid that rental and the law would not
consider subsequent events such as the possibility of pass-on. 32 The court
cited the Darnell-Taenzer reparation case 33 as authority, distinguishing the
"oil jobber" cases on the ground that those plaintiffs had been "middlemen"
who bought only to resell whereas Hanover was a "consumer" of the
machinery.
34
II. THaE NATURE OF PASs-oN THROUGH REGULATED RATES
Before any meaningful analysis can be made of the applicability of
the pass-on defense to a regulated utility company, the nature of such a
plaintiff's pass-on process must be examined in detail. A utility's rate
schedule, which can be analogized to the price list of a competitive firm,
is determined in a rate proceeding. In this proceeding, future demand and
costs are estimated and a rate schedule is developed which should return
to the utility sufficient funds to cover all its costs and provide a fair return
on invested capital. The rate schedule thus developed is normally main-
tained for a considerable period of time, even though the estimates upon
which it is based may soon prove to have been incorrect so that the actual
return to the utility will vary from that anticipated. Despite this fact,
the rate schedule is maintained not only as a practical matter due to the
complexity and expense of developing a new one, but also because its
continuation is considered an important incentive for increased efficiency,35
in that the utility is permitted to profit to the extent that it successfully
competes against the estimated costs. The corollary of this aspect of
prospective rate-making, however, is that the rates cannot be increased
unilaterally by the utility to reflect increased capital costs, an option
theoretically open to non-utilities in a competitive market.
3 1 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curian, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
32 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826 (M.D.
Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960).
3 See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
34 The court also sought to support its result by analogizing to situations in which
an injured plaintiff's tort claim is not reduced simply because the plaintiff has sub-
sequently recouped some of his loss from insurance, friends, or an employment benefit
scheme. 185 F. Supp. at 829. This analogy is criticized in 70 YALE L.J. 469, 475-76
(1961).
3 5See generally SCHWARTZ, FREE ENTERPRISE AND EcONOMIC ORGANIZATION
914-18 (2d ed. 1959).
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One of the costs taken into consideration in the rate proceeding is
annual depreciation on equipment.8 6 Regardless of the method of deprecia-
tion followed,3 7 the annual charge, if based on a realistic estimate of actual
depredation, will eventually reimburse the utility for its capital expendi-
tures.38 It is this annual operating charge for depreciation which creates
the possibility of pass-on in the utility context. But this depreciation-type
of pass-on differs in two important respects from the type dealt with thus
far in the cases. In the oil jobber cases, 9 for example, the defendant oil
companies raised the price of gasoline to the jobbers who immediately made
an exactly equivalent raise in their resale price. In the case of a utility,
however, the overcharge is not passed on in one lump sum but by annual
allocations throughout the useful life of the asset. Nevertheless, this differ-
ence should not lead to a contrary result if the pass-on defense is applicable
in all other respects. The fact that a plaintiff passes on by charging higher
prices to reflect higher depreciation charges over a period of years rather
than to cover a higher cost of goods purchased in a single year is not a
significant distinction. In both instances, the plaintiff can avoid the impact
of the excessive price by passing it on to his customers.
A second and more important difference between the two types of pass-
on is that in the oil jobber cases the overcharge had been completely passed
on at the time of suit, whereas in the present utility actions the excessive
cost will have been only partially passed on by that time. The statute of
limitations on treble damage actions 40 limits recovery to damages suffered
on equipment purchased within four years prior to filing the complaint. 4'
This means that the alleged excessive prices will only relate to relatively
new equipment. Assuming an average life expectancy for this equipment
of twenty years, the equipment will have been only partially depreciated
at the time of suit and, therefore, its costs only partially passed on.
Again, this distinction, of itself, should not make the pass-on defense
inapplicable. Read broadly, the pass-on cases require a plaintiff to show
actual injury by the overcharge in order to recover; under this reading the
possibility of pass-on is just one factor to be considered in determining
36 See authorities cited note 10 supra.
37 See CrtxENs, op. cit. mspra note 10, at 194-97.
38 See authorities cited note 10 supra; SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 35, at 934.
See also Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting in United Rys. & Elec. Co. v. West, 280
U.S. 234, 263 (1930): "The main purpose of the [depreciation] change is that irre-
spective of the rate of depreciation there shall be produced, through annual contribu-
tions, by the end of the service life of the depreciable plant, an amount equal to the
total net expense of its retirement."
39 See cases cited notes 24-25 supra.
4069 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1958).
41The utility complaints only allege damages suffered on equipment purchased
since 1956. The government suit against the electrical companies was filed on May
25, 1960. This tolls the normal four year statute of limitation on treble damage
actions until completion of the government's suit plus one year. 69 Stat. 283 (1955),
15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1958).42 Tables used by a public service commission in determining the useful life of
various assets for depreciation purposes indicate that twenty years is not an un-
reasonable average. CLE ENs, op. cit. supra note 10, at 198-99.
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whether there has been injury. The fact that part of the cost has already
been passed on coupled with a reasonable probability that the balance will
ultimately be passed on should be as disastrous to a plaintiff's claim as is
complete pass-on prior to suit.
III. THE CONCEPTS OF PASS-ON AND ABSORPTION
If the applicability of the pass-on defense is not affected by the fact
that a utility's alleged pass-on is achieved through aniual depreciation
charges and is only partially complete at the time of suit, it becomes neces-
sary to inquire into other factors that might render the concepts of pass-on
and absorption, as developed by the courts, unsuited to the utility-plaintiff.
The concept of pass-on is presented in its classic form in the oil jobber
cases, 4 in which it was held that the jobbers had avoided injury by passing
on the increased cost in their resale price. On the other hand, Straus v.
Victor Talking Mach. Co.,44 is an illustrative case of absorption. Plaintiff-
retailer refused to sign defendant's license agreement and as a result was
denied the privilege of purchasing defendant's products at a discount. In
order to retain his customers, plaintiff was forced to buy defendant's prod-
ucts at retail from other retailers, reselling to his customers at the same
price. In a treble damage action the license agreement was held illegal,
and the plaintiff recovered treble the profit he would have made on sales
during the period had he been permitted to buy at his normal discount.
Absorption was found in plaintiff's continuing to sell at his former price,
even though his costs were increased by defendant's denial of the normal
discount.
If a utility were required to prove absorption it would probably con-
tend that had it been able to purchase the equipment in question at a lower
price, it would be better off financially by the amount of the price differ-
ential. It would have shown a greater net profit in the years since the
equipment was purchased and in future years, since a smaller amount of
current revenues would have had to be allocated to the depreciation account.
Also, this greater net return would have been earned on a smaller invest-
ment and thus have amounted to a greater percentage return on investment.
However persuasive this "better off" argument might be, the pass-on
cases raise the possibility that a utility might be held to have "passed on"
even though it would have been better off with lower prices over the years.
In Wolfe v. National Lead Co.,45 plaintiff had entered the paint business
in 1946 and realized tremendous profits and growth during the following
four years. He then instituted a treble damage action against the two
major producers of titanium pigment, an ingredient of paint, alleging a
conspiracy during 1946-47 to control its allocation. Plaintiff further al-
leged that because of the conspiracy he was unable to obtain enough
43 See cases cited notes 24-25 supra.
44297 Fed. 791 (2d Cir. 1924).
45225 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1955).
"PASS-ON" DEFENSE AND PUBLIC UTILITIES
titanium pigment and was forced to buy a more expensive substitute to fill
his needs. The evidence was undisputed that the substitute had cost the
plaintiff $18,000 more than the equivalent amount of titanium pigment, but
the court, apparently influenced by plaintiff's large profits during the years
of the alleged conspiracy, held that plaintiff could not recover even if there
were an illegal conspiracy since he had failed to show that he did not pass
on the increased cost to his customers.46 In Miller Motors v. Ford Motor
Co.,4 7 plaintiff, an automobile dealer, alleged that on each car purchased
from defendant he was forced to pay an advertising charge which was the
product of an illegal conspiracy. The court found no illegal conspiracy but
went on to say that even had there been such a conspiracy, plaintiff failed
to show that he did not pass on the advertising charge to the purchaser of
the car.
48
It is clear from the facts of both cases that the plaintiffs would have
been financially better off had they been able to purchase at a lower price.4 9
Still both courts found that the plaintiffs might have passed on the increased
cost. One explanation of the court's position might be an implicit presump-
tion that if plaintiff had been able to buy at a lower price, the same price
would have been available to his competitors, so that the resale price level
would have been generally lower. The Supreme Court employed such a
presumption in Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., when it held that
a treble damage plaintiff must negate the possibility of "every other com-
petitor [being] . . . put on a parity" with him in order to prove damages
from an alleged excessive railroad rate.50
If this is the underlying rationale for the statements pertaining to pass-
on in the Wolfe and Miller cases, it is inapplicable in the utility context.
A utility's monopoly position insulates it from the effects of competition
from other electric utility companies; its rates are determined solely by the
utility's own economic position and not by competition from other com-
panies.5 ' Therefore, even if the utility had been able to buy equipment
more cheaply, it would not have had to charge lower rates to meet com-
petition from other utilities enjoying similarly lower equipment costs.
52
46 Id. at 432-33.
47 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958).
48Id. at 448.
4 9 Notwithstanding their rising profits during the relevant years.
50 260 U.S. 156, 164-65 (1922); see Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New
Doctrines of Damages in Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MICE. L. REv. 363, 404 (1952).
See also Secatore's, Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 171 F. Supp. 665, 667 (D. Mass.
1959) where the court employed the same presumption. If such a presumption is
adopted, plaintiff, in proving absorption, must show what price level would have pre-
vailed absent the overcharges.
51 This is not to say that an electric utility company is completely immune from
competitive forces. Electric companies compete with other sources of power, but
these competitors normally would not purchase the same kind of equipment.
52The only analogous presumption which might apply to a utility would be that
had the utility been able to purchase equipment more cheaply, the resultant higher
rate of return would have necessitated a rate reduction. However, the recovery of
overcharges would probably have a small impact on any particular utility's rate of
return.
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But the idea that a plaintiff using the "better off" argument must also
prove that his resale price would have been the same absent the conspiracy
might be applicable to a utility on another ground. It is possible that the
"floor" which the conspiracy placed under equipment prices might have
been taken into account in estimating the utility's equipment costs in its
last rate proceeding. Cognizant of this possibility, a court might rule
that the utility, in order to prove absorption, must show that such a "floor"
was not considered in determining its rates. Such a burden of proof would
be closely analogous to the burden placed on the plaintiffs in the oil jobber
cases, i.e., proving that their resale price was not adjusted upward to avoid
the impact of the higher prices caused by the conspiracy.
Because it is unlikely that direct evidence will be available to prove
whether or not the "floor" was taken into account,5 3 a court might adopt
the position that if the utility earned its historically normal profit during
the years of alleged overcharges, a strong presumption will arise that the
overcharges complained of were passed on. In fact, a careful reading of
the Wolfe and Miller opinions indicates that it was probably this presump-
tion, rather than the one relating to the possible effects of competition on
plaintiff's resale price, that influenced those courts' statements concerning
pass-on.54
Even if a plaintiff-utility's earnings have decreased since it purchased
the equipment, it might still be held to the same burden of proving absorp-
tion. The treble damage provision requires that in order to recover, a
plaintiff must have been injured "by reason of" the unlawful act. This
means that a causal relationship must be established between the alleged
overcharges and the utility's decreased earnings.55 Due to the multitude of
factors which can cause a decrease in earnings, a court might reasonably
require a utility, as part of its proof of absorption, to establish the necessary
link of causality.
53The utility complaints allege that prior to the government criminal action they
were unaware of the conspiracy. In view of this alleged lack of knowledge of the
conspiracy on the part of the utilities, and the fact that the records of the rate pro-
ceedings would probably not reveal that equipment costs were being estimated at a
higher level due to the conspiracy, any proof as to whether the "floor" was taken
into account would have to be inferred from what actually happened. See, e.g.,
Complaint, Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., Civil No. 30016, E.D.
Pa., Aug. 2, 1961.
-54 In Wolfe, the court stressed the fact that plaintiff had enjoyed greater profits
in the years of alleged conspiracy than in the first year when competition was restored.
225 F.2d at 429. In Miller also, the court was impressed by plaintiff's continuing
profits despite the alleged overcharge. "Even if a conspiracy in violation of the Sher-
man Act existed, any increases in the price of defendant's product were passed on
(together with a profit) to the ultimate consumer." 252 F.2d at 448. Cf. ICC v.
United States ex rel. Campbell, 289 U.S. 385 (1933), in which plaintiff-shipper was
forced to pay more than his competitors to have his cars transported from a spur
line onto the main line. The Court held that plaintiff might not have been damaged
-his competitors might merely have made more profit. Id. at 391-92. This case
indicates a judicial hesitancy to equate the possibility of being better off with legal
damages.
55 Cf. Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709, 713 (9th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960). See generally text and authorities cited in Timber-
lake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages in Treble Damage
Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEo. WAsH. L. R-y. 231, 234-36 (1961).
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IV. THE CONSUMER ExCEPTION TO THE PASS-ON DEFENSE
Requiring a utility to carry the burden of proving absorption under
any of the foregoing tests may, as a practical matter, defeat a utility's claim
merely for lack of proof. A utility could avoid the entire burden of prov-
ing absorption, however, if it could fit within the "consumer" exception
to the pass-on defense as enunciated by the Hanover Shoe case.56 In that
case treble damage plaintiffs were divided into two groups, consumers and
middlemen. Consumers, the court held, need not prove absorption in order
to recover since the law, in effect, raises an irrebuttable presumption that a
consumer does not pass on.57
In several respects a regulated electric utility company is similar to the
oil jobbers who were characterized as "middlemen" in the Hanover opin-
ion. The pass-on of the excess cost, if it occurred, is quite apparent and
normally capable of proof. Also like the jobbers, a utility may have escaped
adverse effect from the overcharges if the "floor" placed beneath equipment
prices by the conspiracy was fully reflected in the utility's rate schedule.
On the other hand, a utility is strikingly similar to the shoe manufacturer,
characterized as a "consumer" in the Hanover opinion, in that both pur-
chased equipment not for resale as such, but rather for consumption in the
production of some other product.
It is evident that using a comparison approach to determine whether
a utility fits into the consumer exception is an unrewarding enterprise. The
difficulty of this approach is compounded by the fact that no valid economic
distinction exists between the oil jobber-"middlemen" and the shoe manu-
facturer-"consumer." 58 The manufacturer, in all probability, passed on
the increased machinery rental cost to his customers as effectively as did the
middlemen. Contained in the price which Hanover charged for its shoes
was the cost of producing them, including the excessive machinery rentals.59
The Hanover court defended its position by stating that if the manufacturer
had not paid excessive rentals, it would have had more money for other
purposes including dividends. 60 Underlying this statement, of course, is
the implicit assumption that shoe prices would have been the same even
with the lower rentals; to the extent that prices would have been lower
but for the overcharge, Hanover could not have been injured by the over-
charge, since its profit margin would not have been decreased.61 But if
United had charged Hanover a lower rental, its rentals to all other shoe
manufacturers would probably have been proportionately lower.62 In view
56 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826 (M.D.
Pa.), aff'd, 281 F.2d 481 (1960). This, of course, assumes that other circuits will
follow Hanover.
57 Id. at 831.
58 For the same conclusion see 70 YAIME L.J. 469, 476 (1961).
69 See Appendix to Brief for Appellant, p. 52a, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1960).
00 185 F. Supp. 826, 829 (M.D. Pa. 1960).
01 This ignores the possibility of reduced sales volume at the higher prices; see
note 23 supra.
62 See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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of this possibility of a lower cost structure for the entire industry, the
court's position is untenable absent some proof by Hanover that retail shoe
prices would have been the same without the overcharge.
On this analysis, the only difference between the jobbers and the shoe
company is that the shoe company's pass-on process is more difficult to
visualize because the overcharge on machinery is converted into an in-
creased price on the shoes produced by that machinery. But despite the
economic unreality of the distinction, it may be justifiable on policy grounds.
Two considerations support the application of the pass-on defense in the
oil jobber cases. First, if the jobbers had been able to recover the increased
cost to them without any consideration of pass-on, the defendants con-
ceivably could have been held liable for the same overcharge by at least two
additional parties-the retail station owner and the ultimate consumer.
6 3
The treble damage provision on its face gives an action for damages
to any person injured by violation of the antitrust laws.64 The congres-
sional debates on this provision indicate that this cause of action was not
thought to be limited to initial purchasers from the violator but was to be
available to an ultimate consumer as well.6 5 The wording of the statute
and its legislative history do not prohibit a subsequent vendee from main-
taining an action for the overcharge to the jobbers, assuming that such a
plaintiff could prove that the price increase to him was a direct result of
the price increase to the jobber. The oil jobber result may be justified
as an attempt to choose which of several potential plaintiffs should have
the cause of action for the overcharge. Allowing recovery for the same
overcharge by all the parties in a particular chain of distribution would be
an unreasonable construction of the statute. The courts have already
narrowed the statute to disallow suit by collateral parties for the disruption
of a beneficial financial arrangement with the person primarily injured by
the antitrust violation.6  In such situations the courts have termed the
collateral plaintiff's damage as incidental and denied recovery. 7 The oil
jobber result can be viewed as another judicial limitation on the excessive
liability that might result if the statute were interpreted too broadly.
Second, it was obvious in the oil jobber cases that the plaintiffs had
not been injured by the defendant's activities. The pricing structure of the
6 3 In Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuun Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir.
1943), the chain of distribution could have produced five claimants under an increased
cost theory.
64 "Any person who shall be injured . . . . " 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.
§15 (1958).
65 See, e.g., 21 CONG. REc. 1768 (1890) (remarks of Senator George) ; 21 CONG.
Rzc. 2569 (1890) (remarks of Senator Sherman).
66 "It is well settled that despite its broad language § 4 of the Clayton Act does
not give a private cause of action to a person whose losses result only from an inter-
ruption or diminution of profitable relationships with the party directly affected by
alleged violations of the anti-trust laws." Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe
Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956). See generally Timberlake, supra
note 55, at 240-49; Note, Antitrust Enforcement By Private Parties: Analysis of
Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1020-21 (1952).
o7 See, e.g., Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1951).
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market which was controlled on all levels by the defendants, plus fixed-
margin contracts enjoyed by certain jobbers, resulted in the same margin
of profit to the jobber on all gasoline handled regardless of cost.68 Recovery
of the overcharge would therefore have been a windfall, unjustifiable if the
damage provision is compensatory in function. 69
However, notwithstanding these policy grounds the practical effect of
the pass-on defense is frequently to render defendants immune from any
treble damage recovery whatsoever. There has been a conspicuous absence
of actions under this provision by ultimate consumers, the only plaintiffs
with any chance of overcoming the pass-on barrier. Their lack of sub-
stantial financial interest, 0 their heavy burden of proof, and their lack of
the large sums necessary to successfully prosecute such a suit,71 fully
explain the reluctance of ultimate consumers to sue.7s Thus the analogy
between the result of the pass-on defense and the exclusion of collateral
parties from suing 73 falls short. The exclusion of collateral parties does
not prevent the most interested party-the person initially harmed by the
violation-from suing and vindicating the public interest. The exclusion
of initial purchasers from a monopoly, however, does have that effect.
Acceptance of the pass-on defense, then, places the burden of deterring
price fixing almost entirely upon governmental enforcement of the antitrust
laws which, experience indicates, is often an inadequate deterrent.74 By
effectively precluding the maintenance of a successful treble damage action
for an overcharge, the pass-on doctrine encourages illegal pricing activities
(8 See notes 26 & 27 .rupra.
109 The congressional debates on the Sherman Act do not make clear whether
the treble damage provision was to be solely compensatory or punitive in part. See
21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890). See generally Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under the
Anti-trust Act Penal or Compensatory?, 28 Ky. L.J. 117 (1939), where the author
concludes that they are only compensatory. But see Comment, 18 U. Cin. L. REv.
130, 138 (1950). In any event the courts have carefully sought to prevent windfall
recoveries. See, e.g., Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55
(9th Cir. 1951).
70 See, e.g., Appendix to Brief for Appellant, p. 52a, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1960), indicating that twelve cents
was the maximum amount ever included in the price of a pair of shoes which might
be attributed to any payments to defendant.71 See HA idLToN & TILL, ANTITRUST IN ACTIoN 82-84, 105 (TNEC Mono-
graph No. 16, 1940); Doyle, Treble Damages and Counsel Fees, in AN ANTITRUST
HANDBOOK 549 (1958); McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust
Litigation, 64 HaRv. L. REv. 27 (1950) ; Donovan & Irvine, Proof of Danages Under
the Anti-trust Law, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 511, 524-26 (1940) ; Note, 61 YAL.E L.J. 1010,
1056-58 (1952); Note, 49 YA.LE L.J. 284, 296-97 (1939).72 For congressional recognition that ultimate consumers would rarely be able
to maintain actions under the treble damage provision see, e.g., 21 CONG. REc. 1768
(1890) (remarks of Senator George); id. at 2569 (remarks of Senator Sherman).
73 See notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text.
74 The amendments recently offered by the Attorney General to one of the Phila-
delphia price-fixing complaints, requesting "court orders specifically forbidding the
company [General Electric] to fix prices or commit other antitrust violations in every
field in which the company does business" illustrate the inadequate deterrent effect
of existing sanctions. The Attorney General's recital of the firm's record of antitrust
violations scarcely suggests that it has been deterred by past convictions. See TRADE
REG. REP. 45,060 (1962). See also HAmLT N & TILL, ANTITRUsT iN AcTioN 101-05
(TNEC Monograph No. 16, 1940) ; Note, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1062 (1952), indicating
that effective policing by the government is handicapped by inadequate finances.
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to the extent that profits anticipated from such schemes exceed total pos-
sible fines should the violation be discovered. 75 In contrast, if any pur-
chaser from a conspiracy or monopoly could recover without proving
absorption, price fixing might well become too expensive to be ventured.76
The Hanover decision remedies this deterrent shortcoming insofar as it
allows "consumers" to maintain suits on an increased cost theory regardless
of whether the overcharge was passed on. A highly interested and prob-
ably effective plaintiff is permitted to sue without being required to estab-
lish absorption. Hanover attempted to deal with the windfall issue by
assuming that plaintiff would have had more money in its treasury but for
the excessive rental charges, and thus had actually been injured by the
overcharge. Even if this assumption is unsound, 77 allowing a recovery
without proof of absorption is supportable on the ground of deterrence-
it compels the monopolist to disgorge his illegal profits notwithstanding
a possible windfall to the plaintiff.78 This argument is stronger when, as
in Hanover, the deterrent effect can be achieved without a concomitant
threat of multiple liability for the same overcharge. Ninety percent of
Hanover's output was sold directly to the public through a wholly-owned
subsidiary whose customers lacked a sufficient financial interest to litigate.7 9
As a general proposition, therefore, it might be stated that a plaintiff
should be able to recover without proving absorption whenever the pos-
sibility of suit by subsequent vendees is remote. In determining the pos-
sibility of subsequent suits consideration should be given to not only the
size of a subsequent vendee's financial stake, but also all other relevant
factors, including the probability of a subsequent vendee's proving a direct
relationship between the higher cost and the plaintiff's higher cost. This
proposition, of course, transforms the Hanover exception to the pass-on
defense into a new rule to which the pass-on doctrine is the exception.
Under this analysis some plaintiffs who would normally be considered
middlemen could recover without regard to pass-on, while some manu-
facturers who presently would be termed consumers would have to prove
absorption. For example, the dealer in Miller Motors 8 0 who was held
subject to the pass-on defense would be exempt. The possibility of one
of his customers suing for the overcharge was remote not only because of
the small amount involved 8 1 but also because of the almost impossible
burden of proving that the dealer, except for the overcharge, would have
75 The maximum fine under the present act is fifty thousand dollars, and there is
also the possibility of a jail sentence. Sherman Act §§ 1-2, as amended, 69 Stat. 282
(1955), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1958). This sanction, however, has not been invoked
frequently. See 2 TRADE REG. REP. 18801 (1961).
76 A plaintiff, of course, would still have the heavy burden of showing what the
competitive price would have been absent the conspiracy. See Clark, supra note 50,
at 405.
77 See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text.
78 Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918).
79 Brief for Appellant, p. 27a, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Co.,
281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1960).
80 Miller Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958).
81 The advertising charge varied from five to sixty dollars per car. Id. at 444.
"PASS-ON" DEFENSE AND PUBLIC UTILITIES
given him a better price on the car. Conversely, should a manufacturer sell
his entire output to a single vendee, the possibility of suit by the vendee
might be great enough to warrant imposing upon the manufacturer the
burden of proving absorption as a condition precedent to recovery.
The foregoing analysis would permit a regulated public utility com-
pany to recover on an increased cost theory, without proof of absorption.
This result would follow under the mechanical "consumer" text of the
Hanover case-one who converts a product in the manufacture of another-
or under the policy approach of allowing recovery without proof of absorp-
tion whenever a subsequent suit for the same overcharge is so remote as to
be a virtual impossibility.
In response to a questionnaire, the utility regulating agencies of every
state were in accord that a utility which recovered in a treble damage
action for an overcharge on equipment would be required to reduce the
carrying value of the assets involved by the amount of the overcharge
recovered. 2  Such a reduction would place the utility and its ratepayers
in the economic relationship they would have been in had there been no
overcharge, thus preventing the possibility of any future injury to the
ratepayer by reason of inflated carrying values.8 3  Thus the only remain-
ing claim a ratepayer could have in a subsequent suit would be for injury
during the period extending from the overcharges to the date when the
values were reduced on the company's books. The monetary injury dur-
ing this period would represent ouly a fraction of the total overcharge.
This small financial interest is further reduced by the allocation of the ex-
cess depreciation cost among the utility's numerous ratepayers.8 4 Further-
more, a ratepayer would have fhe apparently impossible burden of proving
that his rates would have been lower but for the overcharges. The com-
bination of these factors would render the possibility of a subsequent suit
by a ratepayer so remote as to warrant allowing the utility to recover with-
out proving absorption 8 5
82 A form questionnaire was sent to each state utility regulatory agency inquiring
how a utility under its jurisdiction would be required to account for a treble damage
recovery. The replies to the questionnaire are on file in the office of the Univer.ty
of Pennsylvania Law Review. Twenty of twenty-two commissions responding indi-
cated that they would make the utility reduce the carrying value of the assets on which
overcharges were recovered by the amount of the recovery representing the over-
charge. The remaining two commissions apparently misunderstood the question posed
since their response was that any recovery would be refunded to the ratepayers. The
amount of the recovery representing the overcharge is actually a return of the com-
pany's capital investment and not the return of money paid in by the ratepayers.
83 Any actual benefit accruing to the ratepayers in the form of commission action
resulting in lower rates might be minimized in "fair value" states where rates are
determined by valuing the rate base at its fair value rather than cost. See generally
BON RIGHT, PRnrcIPIEs OF PUBLIC UTILITr RATES 159-71 (1961). However, since
the equipment involved is relatively new equipment, actual cost and fair values would
probably be quite close. See Village of Milford v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 20
Ill. 2d 556, 170 N.E.2d 576 (1960).
84 It must be noted, however, that the financial interest of a large consumer of
electricity might become significant enough to warrant suit.
85 If the utility commission required that some portion of the treble damage
recovery inure to the benefit of the ratepayers, see note 88 infra, the possibility of
a subsequent ratepayer's suit would be further reduced.
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Two other factors favor allowing recovery by a utility regardless of
pass-on. First, it would most effectively prevent the retention of illegal
profits by the defendants, since under the pass-on theory only the rate-
payers could compel defendants to disgorge. And even assuming a class
action in which all the ratepayers joined as plaintiffs, recovery would prob-
ably be limited to that portion of the overcharge actually depreciated by
the utility. The plaintiffs could not recover for the entire overcharge on a
normal damage theory since the rates scaled to cover depreciation of the
entire overcharge would not yet have been paid. Nor could the ratepayers
recover on the tort doctrine of predictable future damages 8 6 because they
probably would find it impossible to establish with sufficient definiteness that
each will remain a customer of the utility throughout the depreciable life of
the asset.8 7 Second, recovery by a non-absorbing utility would not result in
a complete windfall to the company. As already noted, the state commis-
sions would require the company to deduct from the carrying value of the
assets the amount of the recovery representing the overcharge. In addition,
some commissions answering the questionnaire indicated that a portion of
the trebling increment would inure to the benefit of the ratepayers.
88
V. THE ILLEGAL EXACTION RATIONALE
The authority in the pass-on area is so meager and contradictory that
the courts which will decide the issue in the utility treble damage actions
will have a virtually free hand in reaching their decision and declaring 'its
rationale. The alternatives open to the courts have already been explored.
86 "A person injured by the tort of another is entitled to recover damages from
him for all harm, past, present and prospective, legally caused by the tort." RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS § 910 (1939).
87 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 912, comment e (1939), for a discussion of the
required certainty essential to the recovery of damages for prospective harm. A
permanent industrial ratepayer might be able to prove future injury with the required
degrees of certainty.
88 The commissions were not in accord as to the proper disposition of the trebling
increment of the recovery but did agree that litigation costs and any adverse tax
consequences arising from the recovery should be paid from the trebling increment
and not charged as operating expenses. One commission suggested that the litigation
expense be prorated against the portions of the trebling increment going to the com-
pany and ratepayers respectively. As to the balance of the recovery after these
expenses, the following suggestions were made:
(a) two commissions favored allowing management to keep the entire balance;
(b) two commissions favored deducting the balance from plant accounts;
(c) one commission in addition to the two who favored refunding the entire
recovery, note 82 supra, favored refunding the balance to the ratepayers;
(d) seven commissions favored placing the balance in some sort of surplus
account with variations as to whether this account should be restricted as to divi-
dends;
(e) three commissions favored placing the balance in a special account to be
amortized against income over a period of years;
(f) two commissions favored placing the balance in a contribution-in-aid-of-
construction account or in a special depreciation reserve account;
(g) three commissions favored apportioning the balance between the company
and ratepayers in some equitable fashion. Replies to Questionnaire, note 82 mipra.
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A utility might be held to the burden of proving absorption, or it might be
fitted within the Hanover consumer exception, mechanically applied, to
exempt any plaintiff who converts the product in the manufacture of an-
other product.8 9 The remaining alternative would be to recognize the
policy considerations supporting the Hanover result and permit a utility
to recover without regard to pass-on unless the defendant electrical com-
panies could show a genuine threat of multiple liability for the same
overcharge.
A court permitting recovery on the last alternative would be em-
ploying what has been termed the illegal exaction theory,90 which classifies
as legal damage the payment of an excessive, monopolistic price regardless
of subsequent pass-on. Its basic premise is that a purchaser is entitled to
buy in the market at a competitive price; because of defendant's activities,
however, he was deprived of that right and required to pay an artifically
high price. The purchaser's suit, therefore, is to recoup from the defend-
ant the amount illegally exacted. 91
The illegal exaction theeory has long been understood to permit a
shipper to recover an overcharge by a railroad 92 regardless of whether the
shipper escaped actual harm by passing on the increased freight costs to
his customer.9 3  As noted earlier in the discussion of the Darnell-Taenzer
reparation case,94 the Supreme Court upheld the validity of this theory in
proving damages under the Interstate Commerce Act notwithstanding the
possibility of windfall recoveries. It did so to further the statutory purpose
of deterring excessive charges, since allowing recovery under this theory
increased the likelihood that the railroad would be made to repay the
excessive charge. These policy considerations seem equally applicable to
suits under section 4 of the Clayton Act.
Two early Supreme Court cases intimated that the illegal exaction
theory was valid under the treble damage provision. In Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta,9" the Supreme Court upheld
an award of treble the difference between the price paid by the city for
89 Applying the Hanover consumer exception in this manner will present difficult
classification problems in particular cases. For example, in both Wolfe v. National
Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915 (1955), and United
States Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 163 Fed. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1908), the
plaintiffs sued for an allegedly excessive price on a raw material which was added
to other raw materials to produce the final product. No actual conversion of the
raw material took place as in Hanover, in which the machinery was used to produce
shoes. Whether such manufacturers are consumers under the Hanover rule is un-
clear. The problem would be especially acute where the raw material constituted
the major share of the cost of the final product.
90 See Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 581, 583 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
91This "tort" analysis of the overcharge was expressed in Straus v. Victor
Talking Mach. Co., 297 Fed. 791, 803 (2d Cir. 1924).
92 ADDISOn, TORTS § 27 (6th Ed. 1891).
93 Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918).
94 Ibid.; see text accompanying notes 18-20 .mpra.
95 203 U.S. 390 (1906). This case is square authority for allowing municipalities
who purchased equipment from the conspirators to recover without regard to pass-on.
See note 2 mipra.
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water pipe from a member of the Addyston pipe conspiracy,96 and the price
the city reasonably should have paid in a competitive market. Mr. Justice
Holmes in the opinion for the Court discussed the nature of a treble damage
recovery: "We do not go behind the person of the sufferer. We say that
he has been defrauded, or subjected to duress, or whatever it may be, and
stop there." .7 This language is strikingly similar to that used by the same
Justice in Darnell-Taenser, a reparation case resting specifically on the
illegal exaction theory: "The plaintiffs suffered losses to the amount of
the verdict when they paid. Their claim accrued at once in the theory of
the law and it does not inquire into later events." 9 So also in Thomsen
v. Cayser,9 9 a plaintiff was awarded treble the difference between the price
he had paid for shipping and the price he reasonably should have paid.
In affirming this award, the Court cited "10 a reparation case 101 involving
the illegal exaction theory, again implying that the theory applied to the
treble damage provision.
The only holding by the Supreme Court contrary to the implications
of the preceding two cases was Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry.'10 2
There, a shipper, after attempting unsuccessfully to have the Interstate
Commerce Commission award him reparation for an allegedly excessive
rate, instituted a treble damage action against the railroad alleging that
the rate in question was fixed by an illegal conspiracy which damaged him
to the extent that the rate exceeded what it would have been absent the
conspiracy. The Court's denial of recovery was grounded on the theory
that once the Interstate Commerce Commission has declared rates to be
reasonable and just, a shipper may not bring a treble damage action. This
position was seen as consistent with the congressional purpose of giving
the Commission exclusive jurisdiction to approve rates.1° 3 After enunciat-
ing the basic holding, Mr. Justice Brandeis discussed other defects of
plaintiff's case. One was plaintiff's failure to prove that he, not his cus-
tomers, was actually harmed by the alleged overcharges. 1° 4 The Court's
language seems to say that a plaintiff must prove absorption under the
treble damage provision but not in a reparation action.10 5 However, this
96 See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
97 203 U.S. at 399.
98 Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 534 (1918).
99:243 U.S. 66 (1917).
"O Id. at 88.
101 Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
102260 U.S. 156 (1922).
103 This interpretation of the case is borne out in JAFFE & NATHANSON, Arn-
MINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 443 (1961). See also DAvIS, ADmIN-
isTRATIv= LAW § 173, at 578 n.63 (1951), where the author explains the case as one
involving the res judicata effect of the prior Commission determination as to the
reasonableness of the rates.
104 "Exaction of this higher legal rate may not have injured Keogh at all; for
a lower rate might not have benefited him. . . . The benefit might have gone to
his customers, or conceivably, to the ultimate consumer." 260 U.S. at 165.
105 "Under § 7 of the Anti-trust Act, as under § 8 of the Act to Regulate Com-
merce . . . recovery cannot be had unless it is shown, that, as a result of defendants'
acts, damages in some amount susceptible of expression in figures resulted. These
damages must be proved by facts from which their existence is logically and legally
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language was not essential to the Court's holding, and because the Chat-
tanooga and Thomsen cases were not considered in the opinion both are
presumably still good authority.
Since these Supreme Court decisions, the validity of the illegal exac-
tion theory in the context of the Clayton Act has been denied in the oil
jobber cases 106 and upheld by the Hanover court, although in both in-
stances its scope was limited to consumers. From the standpoint of au-
thority, therefore, a court allowing a plaintiff to recover under section 4
without proof of absorption might be said to be merely correcting the cur-
rent confusion in this area-a confusion which might be attributable to
the unfortunate chronological order in which the various pass-on cases
were decided. Ideally, the Hanover case should have come first, provid-
ing an easy case in which to enunciate a general rule that the pass-on
defense is inapplicable, without the necessity of distinguishing the oil jobber
cases. Had the oil jobber cases then followed rather than preceded
Hanover, the courts could have developed an exception to the general rule
to cover the situations in which multiple liability is a real danger.
VI. CONCLUSION
By adopting the illegal exaction theory in the utility cases the courts
could add significantly to the deterrent effect of the treble damage suit.
The initial purchaser, who is normally the most interested party and the
one best able to vindicate the public interest in deterring price fixing,
would have a substantially lessened burden of proof. As a consequence,
potential price fixers would have to anticipate a greater possibility of re-
paying treble the amount of any profits they might hope to make from
the scheme.'0 7 This factor would significantly alter the balance of con-
siderations employed in reaching a price-fixing decision. Presently, a
potential violator need only anticipate minimal fines, a slim possibility of
jail sentences, and an even more remote threat of repaying the illegal profits
in a treble damage action'D
8
inferable . . . . It is not like those cases where a shipper recovers from the carrier
the amount by which its exaction exceeded the legal rate. . . . Here the instrument
by which the damage is alleged to have been inflicted is the legal rate, which, while
in effect, had to be collected from all shippers." Id. at 164-65 (citations omitted).
106 See cases cited notes 21-25 supra.
107 Allowance of the illegal exaction theory as the normal theory of recovery
under the treble damage provision would, to a large extent, give effect to the sug-
gested revision of the treble damage provision urged in HAMmTON & TILL, op. cit.
supra note 74, at 101-05. At the conclusion of their study of the antitrust laws, the
authors suggest that the rationale of the antitrust statute be changed from its pre-
dominately criminal basis to one of tort. The authors suggest a variable penalty,
possibly double the net profits earned by the violator during the period of violation.
See McConnell, The Treble Damage Action, 1950 U. ILL. L.F. 659, 668, arguing
that a violator should be made liable to an injured plaintiff for the benefit received
by the violator from the infraction. See also, THoRELLi, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
PoLicy 615-16 (1955), setting out the original draft of the treble damage provision
which provided for recovery of the full consideration paid for an article whose price
was advanced by a combination.
108 Commentators are in agreement that a violator might well risk the relatively
small fine involved in an antitrust conviction, but not a treble damage recovery. See
1962]
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Only the possibility of multiple liability weighs against the applica-
tion of the illegal exaction theory. No such danger exists under the Inter-
state Commerce Act where privity is requisite to a reparation action,10 9
but it does exist under the Clayton Act, since privity is not required.110
This consideration, however, should not be allowed to sap the effectiveness
of the treble damage action as a deterrent to price fixing. Instead, the
illegal exaction theory should be recognized as the normal rule, qualified
only in the exceptional case.
In most instances subsequent suits are not a real threat; there has
never been a suit by a subsequent vendee for an overcharge in the entire
history of the treble damage provision. The most serious threat of multiple
suits occurs in a situation like that of the oil jobber cases in which the de-
fendant controlled not only the price to the initial purchaser but his resale
price as well. In such a situation a subsequent suit is quite likely since
the relationship between the defendant's illegal activities and the subse-
quent vendee's price can be proved with little difficulty. The exception to
the rule, therefore, might be restricted to those cases where the defendant
controlled prices at all intermediate levels down to the ultimate consumer.
But while this narrow exception would provide a simple mechanical rule
for the courts to apply, it might not give adequate protection to defendants.
A better formulation of the exception would permit recovery under the
illegal exaction theory unless the defendant could prove that a subsequent
suit for the same overcharge is a real possibility. This would be more
inclusive than the "controlled price" exception, since it would protect the
defendant in a situation in which the subsequent vendee could also prove
damage even though the defendant did not control the plaintiff's resale
price-for example, when the plaintiff sold his entire output to a single
vendee on a cost-plus basis.
If a defendant fit within the exception, the plaintiff would have to
prove absorption in order to recover. Proof of absorption under this
analysis, however, would not be for the purpose of establishing actual
injury since that is not a prerequisite to recovery under the illegal exaction
theory, but rather, it would be the tool whereby the court could decide
whether the instant plaintiff was the proper party plaintiff in those few
cases in which more than one potential plaintiff was capable of suing for
the same overcharge. In this manner the courts could recognize the
illegal exaction theory under section 4 with its salutary deterrent effect,
yet avoid unreasonable results in the exceptional situations.
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